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Stances, Voluntarism, Relativism 
 
Martin Kusch 
 
§1. Introduction 
 
In this paper I want to explore two ideas put forward and defended in Bas van 
Fraassen’s The Empirical Stance (2002) (=ES) as well as in some related papers. The 
first idea is that many philosophical positions are best rendered not as “doctrines” 
but as “stances,” that is, as sets, systems or bundles of values, emotions, policies, 
preferences, and beliefs. (To avoid torturous repetition, I shall refer to sets of values, 
emotions, policies and preferences as “VEPPs”.) The second idea is a form of 
epistemology that van Fraassen calls “epistemic voluntarism.” It is based on the 
rejection of two received views: that principles of rationality determine which 
philosophical positions and scientific paradigms we must adopt, and that 
epistemology is (akin to) a descriptive-explanatory (scientific) theory of cognition. I 
shall relate the stance-idea and epistemic voluntarism to debates over (epistemic) 
relativism.  
 
§2. Stances 
 
ES seeks to renew empiricism. According to van Fraassen, empiricism is first and 
foremost a “rebellion” against metaphysics. This is because “metaphysicians 
interpret what we initially understand into something hardly anyone understands, 
and then insist that we cannot do without that“ (2002: 3).  Take the question “Does 
the world exist?“ To answer this question, metaphysicians use a technical concept of 
world. David Lewis for instance holds that a world simply is “the sum of all things 
spatio-temporally related to a given thing” (2002: 10). How does Lewis arrive at this 
result? Why is the mingle-mangle of things more or less distantly related to me “a 
world?” As ES sees it, Lewis simply “postulates” how “world” is to be understood and 
that it exists. It is here that van Fraassen “rebels:”  “… I did not ask whether the 
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existence of the world can be consistently postulated! I asked: Does the world 
exist?“ (2002: 10). 
 
Empiricism rejects Lewis’ and other metaphysicians’ theorizing. This rejection is 
motivated by empiricism’s core elements. In order to explain what these core 
elements are, van Fraassen first offers a reflection on how in general philosophical 
positions are to be understood. His primary target is what he calls “Principle Zero:”  
 
(Principle Zero) For each philosophical position X there exists a statement X+ 
such that to have (or take) position X is to believe (or decide to believe) that X+. 
(2002: 41) 
 
Assume Principle Zero were adequate. What then would be the dogma “E+” for 
empiricism? Going by the received (textbook) view, the most obvious candidate, at 
least for the “naïve empiricist,” is the following:  
 
(E+) Experience is the one and only source of information. (2002: 43) 
 
If Principle Zero were correct, van Fraassen thinks, then it would have to be able to 
perform a crucial critical function. For any alternative (=A) to empiricism, if A’s A+ 
were to turn out incompatible with E+, then the (naïve) empiricist would thereby 
have reason enough to reject A, and even without entering into any further 
argumentative give-and-take. For instance, given Principle Zero, an empiricist 
critique of metaphysics would have to show no more than that metaphysics and its 
central dogma is incompatible with E+.  
 
ES does not accept Principle Zero and its interpretation of the encounter between 
empiricism and metaphysics. In order to summarize the argument succinctly, I shall 
use “empiricismE+” for an empiricism rendered in terms of Principle Zero and E+. van 
Fraassen’s key move is the reminder that the content of empiricism in general, or 
empiricismE+ in particular, is not exhausted by E+. A crucial further element of both is 
an admiration for the ideal of empirical science, to wit, the ideal according to which 
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all empirical hypotheses deserve an unbiased and open-minded investigation. 
EmpiricistsE+ emulate this ideal when they think of E+ as an empirical hypothesis and 
as subject to rigorous empirical testing (2002: 42-44).  
 
Unfortunately the ideal of an open-minded testing of empirical hypotheses is 
incompatible with how empiricistsE+ intend to rule out metaphysics. EmpiricistsE+ 
want E+ to immediately and directly rule out of court every alternative A whose A+ is 
incompatible with E+. And yet, if E+ is an empirical hypothesis, then so are 
statements contradicting E+. Some of the latter are core doctrines (=A+) of 
alternative philosophical positions, like metaphysics. But if these A+ too are 
empirical hypotheses then they too deserve to be tested in the normal way of 
empirical science. In other words, these A+, or non-E+, cannot be ruled out on the 
sole the basis that they conflict with E+. 
 
For ES all this is reason enough to give up Principle Zero and empiricismE+. van 
Fraassen’s empiricism—let’s call it “empiricismvF”—is defined not by a single dogma 
like E+ but by a set of VEPPs and beliefs. This gives the admiration for the ideal of 
empirical-scientific inquiry a new role in the opposition to metaphysics. EmpiricismvF 
can rule out metaphysics immediately, and without entering into extended debate. 
This is, van Fraassen claims, because metaphysics does not emulate the conduct of 
empirical science; it does not value empirical hypotheses; and it does not engage in 
the empirical testing of philosophical theses. We have here an incompatibility in 
VEPPs rather than an incompatibility in dogmas. But it still gives the empiricistvF a 
sufficient and immediate reason for rejection or rebellion.  
 
Making VEPPs central to our understanding of empiricism naturally leads to the idea 
that many philosophical positions are “stances” rather than “dogmas.” What 
characterizes empiricismvF is a … 
 
… rejection of explanation demands and dissatisfaction with and disvaluing of 
explanation by postulate … calling us back to experience, … rebellion against 
theory, ideals of epistemic rationality, … admiration for science, and the virtue 
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they see in an idea of rationality that does not bar disagreement. … The 
attitudes that appear in this list are to some extent epistemic and to some 
extent evaluative, and they may well involve or require certain beliefs for their 
own coherence. But none are equatable with beliefs.  (2002: 47) 
 
As ES has it, empiricism is not the only philosophical position best rendered as a 
stance. The same applies to materialism. van Fraassen defends this claim by showing 
that materialists had better not commit to a M+ like “Only matter exists.” Given the 
fact that natural science has frequently revolutionized our understanding of matter, 
“Only matter exists” lacks any determinate content over time. It is much better 
therefore to understand materialism in terms of VEPPs. For instance, materialists 
admire the ingenuity of many foundational scientific theories, and they are 
committed to following science on what there is (2002: 60). 
 
§3. Objectifying Epistemology, Epistemic Voluntarism and Scientific Revolutions 
 
Having proposed a new understanding of philosophical positions, ES turns to 
introducing and defending “epistemic voluntarism.” Epistemic voluntarism is based 
on two central claims: 
  
(i) that principles of rationality underdetermine our choice of philosophical stances 
or scientific paradigms; and  
(ii) that a theory of epistemic rationality must not be “objectifying,” that is, it must 
not be a descriptive-explanatory theory of cognition.  
 
By “principles of rationality” van Fraassen means primarily deductive logic, the 
theory of probability, and the practical syllogism. As long as we stick to these 
principles we avoid inconsistency and incoherence; we avoid reasoning in ways 
that—even by our own lights—results in “self-sabotage:” a reasoning that prevents 
us from reaching our goals (2002: 88, 224). 
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ES defends (i) by drawing on an idea by William James (1956). According to James, 
we have two central goals in our epistemic life: to believe as many truths as possible, 
and to believe as few falsehoods as possible. Since we cannot maximize both goals at 
once, each one of us implicitly or explicitly fixes their respective “risk-quotients.” 
Each one of us has to choose which of the two goals is more important (either in 
general or in specific contexts). Deductive logic and the theory of probability do not 
tell us how to make this choice. Our choice must therefore be based upon VEPPs 
(2002: 87). Which brings us back to the stances, but with a new twist. Stances now 
turn out to be important not just as renderings of some philosophical positions; they 
also turn out to be significant in how we organize our epistemic practices. 
 
ES argues for (ii) by revisiting the issue of scientific revolutions. van Fraassen agrees 
with Thomas Kuhn’s and Paul Feyerabend’s thought that, from the perspective of 
the pre-revolutionary old paradigm, the post-revolutionary new paradigm seems 
“literally absurd, incoherent, obviously false, or worse—meaningless, unintelligible.” 
And yet, differently from Kuhn or Feyerabend, van Fraassen allows for a different 
perspective after the revolution. From the post-revolution perspective, the pre-
revolution viewpoint can be understood as a partial truth (2002: 71). For instance, it 
follows from Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity that Newton’s Laws of Motion are 
true for entities whose velocity is small when compared with the speed of light 
(2002: 115) Moreover, van Fraassen thinks that scientific revolutions often result in 
the discovery of ambiguities in the old paradigm. Thus Newtonians did not realize 
that mass could be characterized as “proper mass,” “gravitational mass,” and 
“inertial mass.” And they therefore regarded as absurd the notion that mass varies 
with velocity (2002: 113). 
 
According to ES, the litmus-test for every epistemology is whether it is able to 
preserve the rationality of scientific revolutions while acknowledging the element of  
“conversion” at their very heart. Objectifying epistemologies that describe and 
explain how our cognitive apparatus fits into the world do not pass muster. They fail 
the litmus-test since they invariably are enmeshed with the scientific theories of 
their day. The objectifying epistemology en vogue during the reign of the old 
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paradigm licenses the old paradigm’s epistemic ways. It therefore cannot but reject 
as irrational the epistemic practices of the new paradigm (2002: 81). 
 
Epistemic voluntarism does better for three reasons. First, it is prescriptive-
evaluative rather than descriptive-explanatory (2002: 82). This lessens the ties to 
prevalent scientific paradigms. Second, epistemic voluntarism is minimalist (cf. (i) 
above). And third, epistemic voluntarism gives emotion—or similar “impulses”—a 
legitimate place in our epistemic life. Points two and three connect epistemic 
voluntarism to the stance-idea. van Fraassen’s thought seems to be that scientific 
paradigms are, or include, one or more scientific stances.  
 
ES’s example for how emotions can change one’s epistemic options comes from 
Franz Kafka’s short story Metamorphosis. One morning, Gregor, the son of the 
Samsa-family, wakes up in the shape of a gigantic beetle, unable to communicate 
with humans. Initially his parents and his sister Grete think of the beetle as their son 
or brother. Alas, this rendering of the situation makes their life unbearable. There 
just is no way to maintain a normal family life when one family member is an insect. 
It is only when Grete eventually has an emotional breakdown that the parents find a 
way forward: they take the beetle for nothing but a beetle—and kill it (2002: 106). 
Grete’s emotion enables the family to recognize the situation more correctly, at least 
when judged retrospectively.  
 
Going beyond van Fraassen’s own words, we can use Metamorphosis also to 
illustrate another central claim of ES, to wit, the claim that scientific revolutions 
involve a re-interpretation of central rules guiding scientific work (2002: Ch. 4). The 
Samsa-family, throughout the whole episode, operates with the rule Protect the 
members of your family. Initially this rule is used in a “conservative way:” Gregor and 
the beetle are taken to be the same person. And thus Gregor-the-beetle remains 
within the domain of the rule. After Grete’s breakdown however, the rule is 
interpreted in a “revolutionary way:” it is understood as legitimating the killing of 
the beetle. The family now thinks that the beetle has destroyed and replaced 
Gregor. Killing the insect safeguards Grete’s well-being and revenges Gregor.  
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One central rule in empirical science is “Sola experientia!” Defenders of the old 
paradigm use this rule in a conservative-defensive way. They insist that their 
paradigm is fully based upon experience (observation and experiment) and free of 
idle speculation. The proponents of the new paradigm instead accuse the old 
paradigm of violating Sola experientia!. They use Sola experientia! in a revolutionary 
way. For instance, Newton’s critics identified his assumptions concerning absolute 
time and space as metaphysical baggage not licensed by experience. The upshot is 
that scientific revolutionaries do not simply throw scientific rationality overboard. 
But they interpret it in radically new ways. And there must be an emotion-like 
“impulse” to set off such developments. (2002: Ch. 4) 
 
§4. Challenges, Allies, Refinements 
 
In this section I shall discuss three ways of developing van Fraassen’s ideas further. 
These ways will be important when we turn to the issue of relativism in the following 
sections.  
 
(a) Policies 
 
Several authors have elaborated on what it means to occupy a stance. Paul Teller’s 
(2004, 2011) suggestion has rightly received most attention. Teller proposes that 
committing to a stance is like “adopting a policy.” And this involves the following 
features. (I reformulate them in my own words for the sake of brevity.)  
 
(1) To adopt a policy P is to commit oneself to acting or deciding in accordance 
with a statement of P. 
(2) A policy is not true or false, but useful, clever, or easy to use.  
(3) Policies can be overridden by other policies.  
(4) To apply a policy is to interpret it. 
(5) Applying a policy requires “judgment.”  
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(6) Policies are “expressions or implementations of values” (2004: 167). 
(7) Policies simplify decision-making. 
(8) It is possible to argue for or against policies. But since policies are at least in 
part based on value commitments, such arguments cannot be straightfor-
wardly factual. Defences of policies often appeal to more general policies. 
(2004: 167-168) 
 
One of the strengths of this suggestion is that it sheds light on the relationship 
between stances and beliefs. Policies are “recipes” for generating beliefs, but not 
themselves beliefs or belief-like. Note though that policies do not just generate 
beliefs; policies in turn depend upon beliefs for their operation and defence.  
 
Teller’s proposal should not, however, be pushed too far. While stances are plausibly 
thought of as including policies, it would not be right to equate the two. Stances are 
more comprehensive than policies; they also include values, emotions, preferences, 
and beliefs. Starting from the policies we can see how the other elements come into 
view. Still, the other elements do not simply collapse into parts or moments of 
policies. Remember that empiricism is about the “rejection of explanation demands 
… disvaluing of explanation by postulate … calling us back to experience, … rebellion 
against theory, ideals of epistemic rationality, … admiration for science, and the 
virtue they see in an idea of rationality that does not bar disagreement. …” (2002: 
47). It takes some conceptual violence to squeeze all these attitudes and actions into 
the policy-format.  
 
If we straightforwardly equate stances with policies for generating beliefs, it 
becomes difficult to appreciate the dichotomy of stance and dogma. If we equate 
stances with policies we invariably end up wondering whether the stance qua policy 
isn’t simply the road to the dogma (cf. Lipton 2004). Again, we can preserve the 
difference between the two renderings of philosophical positions only if we allow 
stances to have content beyond policies. We can then state the differences between 
the two views of philosophical positions as follows. Principle Zero treats the dogma 
and its justification as crucial, and everything else (like VEPPs) as merely contingently 
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and externally related to the dogma. The stance-account claims that VEPPs are what 
defines (certain) philosophical positions, and that “dogmas” are typically no more 
than “glosses” or “post-hoc rationalizations” of non-doxastic elements.  
 
(b) “ … not straightforwardly factual …” 
 
Even though I have cautioned against equating stances and policies, I still find the 
idea of epistemic policies as parts of stances fruitful. Amongst other things it allows 
us to get a better handle on epistemic voluntarism. Remember epistemic 
voluntarism’s two central ingredients: it rejects objectifying epistemology, and it 
involves a minimalism about rationality. 
 
van Fraassen doesn’t spend much time searching for potential allies for epistemic 
voluntarism. But one such potential ally clearly stands out: Hartry Field’s 2009 paper 
“Epistemology without Metaphysics.” Already the very title should be music to van 
Fraassen’s ears. Field’s meta-epistemology is a form of expressivism; and 
expressivism has of course been a constant element in empiricist thinking for the 
past hundred years. As Field has it, a sentence in which we evaluate someone’s 
epistemic justification, “expresses a mental state that is a resultant of norms and 
factual beliefs” (2009: 252). Put differently, “epistemic evaluations, like other 
evaluations, aren’t straightforwardly factual” (2009:250). 
 
Epistemic norms for Field are not “fairly general normative propositions” (2009: 
258); epistemic norms are “policies:” “a policy both for believing (or believing to a 
certain degree) and for acting so as to improve one’s epistemic situation.” Epistemic 
policies may be highly local or general. And they can play a variety of different roles: 
sometimes we are guided by them; sometimes we evaluate in accordance with 
them; sometimes we are committed to them. (2009: 260).  
 
It is important to stress that treating epistemic norms as policies is part and parcel of 
Field’s attempt to free epistemology from metaphysics. Epistemic norms are not 
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facts in the world, Platonic entities, or “there anyway.” They are not truths about 
epistemic values. They are not true or false at all. van Fraassen would surely agree. 
 
Finally, note that at least in his 2009 paper Field is adamant that his “evaluationism” 
is a form of “relativism.” Every epistemic evaluation is relative to a norm. No sense 
can be made of an absolute perspective on evaluations or norms. This does not 
mean that Field would subscribe to the “idea that all norms are equally good” (2009: 
255): to attribute this thesis to relativism “is just refusing to take relativism with 
even an iota of seriousness” (2009: 256). To make epistemic evaluation norm-
relative is not to say that we cannot evaluate some norms as better than others. It is 
to say that any such evaluation of norms is in turn relative to norms. As we shall see 
below, van Fraassen should say pretty much the same thing.  
 
(c) Moderate versus radical epistemic voluntarism 
 
van Fraassen’s epistemic voluntarism is premised on the distinction between stance-
transcending principles of rationality on the one hand, and stance-specific values, 
emotions, preferences and policies on the other hand. One way to put pressure on 
this distinction is to ask whether epistemic voluntarism isn’t demanding too much. 
van Fraassen himself poses the crucial question thus:  
 
What if I detect a straightforward contradiction in someone’s beliefs, conclude 
that he has sabotaged himself in the management of his opinions, and he turns 
out to be Graham Priest? Priest happily admits to believing that certain 
contradictions are or may be true. (2004a: 184) 
 
In response van Fraassen readily admits that Priest’s beliefs are consistent. But he 
goes on to suggest that Priest’s logic is “quite different from the one most familiar to 
us” and that evolutionary arguments might ultimately speak against it (2004a: 185). 
 
This response does not quite seem to address the challenge that Priest poses. The 
issue is not whether Priest’s beliefs about paraconsistent logic are consistent; the 
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question is rather whether consistency and coherence should be the supreme 
touchstones of rationality in the first place. Priest argues that consistency is a matter 
of degree and must always be weighed against other cognitive values such as 
“simplicity” (“Is the theory clean and elegant, or is it complex and contrived?”), 
“unity” (“Does it have to invoke numerous ad hoc hypotheses …?”), “explanatory 
power” (“Can the theory be used to explain other things in the same domain …?”) or 
“parsimony” (“Does the theory multiply entities beyond necessity?”) (2005: 123). It 
is hard to see how evolutionary arguments could work against this account.  
 
If Priest is right about consistency and its relation to other epistemic values, then it 
becomes difficult for van Fraassen to maintain the distinction between stance-
transcending principles of rationality and stance-dependent VEPPs. If consistency can 
be rationally overruled, then it cannot be the universal and necessary criterion of 
rationality. If consistency can be overruled, then a stance which does so is not per se 
irrational. On this alternative picture, differences between rationally acceptable 
stances may be differences in what weight these stances give different “cognitive 
values,” including the value of consistency.  
 
Of course van Fraassen also has a second stance-transcending criterion of rationality, 
to wit, the demand not to reason in a way that constitutes self-sabotage. This formal 
criterion leaves open which principles of rationality and cognitive values one 
commits to, as long as self-sabotage is avoided. This is a rather vague criterion but 
perhaps the best we can do.  
 
It should be added that the challenge to van Fraassen’s emphasis on consistency 
does not just come from Priest’s controversial views. Philosophers of science like 
Kuhn, Feyerabend or Peter Lipton (2004) have argued along similar lines. Lipton’s 
position is especially interesting here since he writes in response to van Fraassen’s 
book.  
 
Lipton suggests that Kuhn’s paper “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice” 
(1977) can be read as a “constructive proof of voluntarism.” Kuhn offers “shared 
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epistemic values” (accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness) as the 
rational backbone of theory- or paradigm-choice. But Kuhn also insists that different 
scientists may rationally favour some values over other; interpret a given value in 
differently; or resolve conflicts between these epistemic values in variant ways 
(Lipton 2004: 153-55). All this is clearly in line with epistemic voluntarism. Note 
however that consistency is again part of the value-mix and not standing outside as 
the ultimate touchstone or arbiter. 
 
Lipton raises a number of questions concerning the differences between principles 
of rationality and (stance-dependent) epistemic policies or values. One question is 
how much difference is needed for there to be a difference of stance. Do two 
scientists have different stances just because they weigh the same epistemic value 
differently? Can we read off a scientist’s inferences which stances, values or policies 
they have adopted? Lipton is sceptical since very often there will be other possible 
explanations like background beliefs or differences in evidence (2004: 155-157). 
 
Lipton has a point. Perhaps the best way to respond to his challenge is to modify van 
Fraassen’s bifurcation of principles of rationality and stance-dependent values and 
policies. The modification I have in mind is to follow Kuhn and Priest and let 
rationality consist in one’s honouring all or some of the epistemic values. Kuhn and 
Priest list some of these values, but no doubt there are more. Indeed, which 
epistemic values there are, can only be determined by research in cognitive 
psychology and the history and philosophy of science (including epistemology). This 
does not give us a firm and fixed base; but perhaps it is the conditio humana to cope 
without such foundation.  
 
To sum up this train of thought, we should distinguish between moderate and 
radical voluntarism. van Fraassen’s voluntarism is moderate in so far as he assumes 
a clear-cut borderline between stance-transcending principles of rationality and 
stance-dependent VEPPs. Radical voluntarism denies that there is a clear borderline 
here. i 
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§5. Relativism 
 
In this section I shall discuss the relationship between epistemic voluntarism 
(including the stance-idea) and epistemic relativism from two different angles. In 
subsection (a) I shall focus on the question whether epistemic voluntarism involves a 
form of relativism. In (b) I shall suggest that at least some forms of relativism can 
fruitfully be rendered as stances rather than doctrines. In (c) I shall deal with some 
general objections regarding my argument in (b). 
 
(a) Epistemic voluntarism and relativism 
 
Epistemic voluntarism even in its moderate form seems to involve a form of 
epistemic relativism: 
 
(I)   The epistemic status of judgements is relative to stances. 
(II)   Different stances evaluate the same judgements differently. 
(III)   There is no perspective from which stances can be neutrally and absolutely 
ranked.  
(IV)  The move from one stance to another can have the character of a “conver-
sion:” principles of rationality combined with empirical data cannot compel 
a transition from one stance to another. 
 
van Fraassen himself invokes the idea of conversion as follows: 
 
Being or becoming an empiricist will then be similar or analogous to conversion 
to a cause, a religion, an ideology, to capitalism or to socialism, to a worldview 
such as Dawkins’s selfish gene view or the view Russell expressed in “Why I am 
Not a Christian.” (2002: 60) 
 
And elsewhere he comments: 
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If this is relativism, it is certainly not debilitating relativism—it is only an 
acknowledgement of the logic of this aspect of the human condition (2004b: 
11).  
 
I take it that by “debilitating relativism” van Fraassen means a form of relativism that 
makes its advocate unable to judge or argue. Perhaps he is thinking of versions of 
epistemic relativism that declare all stances to be “equally valid.” Clearly, if all 
stances are equally valid then there cannot be much point in arguing whether the 
beliefs licenced by one stance are superior to those licensed by another stance.  
 
van Fraassen’s alternative is worth spelling out pedantically. I shall here assume 
moderate rather than radical epistemic voluntarism. Let “S1” and “S2” stand for two 
incompatible stances (or paradigms), “AS1” and “BS1” for two proponents of S1; “CS2” 
for a proponent of S2, and “p” for a proposition over which A, B, or C disagree.  
 
Clearly, when AS1 and BS1 disagree over p, they have a rich shared background of 
principles of rationality and stance-specific VEPPs to adjudicate their differences. 
This shared background will often determine which view on p is bindingly correct 
and which is incorrect.  
 
Could AS1 convince CS2 to stop occupying S2? One possibility is that adherence to S2 
is irrational in light of the stance-transcending principles of rationality, and that CS2 
therefore engages in self-sabotage. Here the principles of rationality are a common 
and neutral ground.  
 
The situation is different when neither side flouts the principles of rationality. This 
does not pre-empt argument and changing the other’s mind, but there no longer is a 
universal common ground capable of adjudicating the differences. At least two 
things might happen in such setting:  
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- AS1 might be able to show CS2 that one of CS2’s VEPPs or beliefs is insufficiently 
motivated by a VEPP or belief that AS1 and CS2 share (but that is not necessarily 
shared by other stances). 
  
- AS1 might be able to show CS2 that one of CS2’s VEPPs or beliefs is insufficiently 
motivated by one of CS2 own beliefs or VEPPs (not shared by AS1). 
  
What should AS1 say about CS2 or S2 more generally, when neither of these strategies 
succeed? One thing is clear: AS1 is not compelled to treat his own S1 and C’s S2 as 
“equally valid.” Given AS1’s VEPPs and beliefs, there may well be good grounds for 
AS1 to reject S2 and at least some of the VEPPs and beliefs that constitute S2.  
 
The above reflections were based on moderate epistemic voluntarism. The situation 
changes when we replace moderate with radical epistemic voluntarism. In this case 
the common ground will be smaller. Instead of stance-transcending principles of 
rationality we only have a partially shared set of epistemic values given different 
weights. But even in this case, argument is surely possible—at least when the values 
relevant to the adjudication between S1 and S2 are shared. 
 
Where does all this leave the debate between empiricistsvF and metaphysicians? 
Assume that both sides honour the principles of rationality and thus have coherent 
systems of beliefs and values. Would empiricistsvF be able to reject metaphysics 
under these conditions? van Fraassen’s answer should be clear. EmpiricistsvF 
recognize that they share VEPPs and beliefs with sensible metaphysicians (an 
admiration for aspects of science, for example). But it does not follow that 
empiricists have to tolerate the metaphysical stance as an equal. To repeat, another 
stance does not become my stance’s equal just because the other stance is 
consistent and coherent. The empiricistsvF’ values—and especially the value attached 
to the empirical-scientific testing of empirical hypothesis—license a direct rejection 
of metaphysics.ii Still, this does not preclude empiricistsvF’ efforts at convincing the 
metaphysicians—albeit that there is no guarantee of success. 
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To summarize what I take to be the main lesson of this subsection, I hope to have 
made plausible that van Fraassen’s epistemic voluntarism does indeed involve a 
form of relativism. But this relativism is benign rather than debilitating: it does not 
declare all stances equally valid, and it allows for meaningful discussion across 
stances. 
 
(b) Applying the stance-idea to relativism: The example of SSK 
In this subsection I shall change tack. Rather than exploring the link between 
voluntarism and relativism, I shall here concentrate on the stance-idea in its 
relationship to relativism. My guiding question is this: Is (epistemic) relativism a 
philosophical stance (like empiricismvF)? Or, more precisely, are all forms of 
relativism best thought of as stances, or perhaps only some? These are intriguing 
questions suggested by van Fraassen’s work. Addressing them adequately would 
demand a separate paper. Here I am content to give one example of a form of 
relativism that is naturally thought of as a stance. It is also a position that is similar to 
van Fraassen’s in some unexpected ways. I am referring to the “Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge” (=SSK), as it has been developed and defended by David Bloor.   
Like empiricismvF so also SSK is naturally thought of as a “rebellion.” But in Bloor’s 
case the rebellion is not just against metaphysics, it is against philosophy tout court: 
“To ask questions of the sort which philosophers address to themselves is usually to 
paralyze the mind” (1991: 52). In particular Bloor dismisses work in epistemology 
and the philosophy of science. He faults these fields for having no “controlled input 
of data.” Since such control is missing, epistemological discussions are “simply 
affirmations of the values and perspectives of some social group” (1991: 80). Bloor 
tries to substantiate this allegation by showing that Popper’s and Kuhn’s 
philosophies of science are expressions of values and “thought-styles” going back to 
Enlightenment (Popper) or Romantic (Kuhn) ideologies (1991: 62).  
Bloor does not just compare philosophy unfavourably to science. He also finds 
philosophy deserving of less respect than theology. This has to do with the 
arguments over relativism versus absolutism. In the Vatican Bloor finds “a clear-
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sighted absolutism in action.” For instance, Pope Benedict XVI’s argument “against 
relativism is grounded in his faith in God as the ultimate source of truth” (2007: 254). 
Secular philosophers mistakenly think that they can defend absolutism without 
explaining their access to absolute truth. 
Despite his contempt for much of philosophy, Bloor is happy to declare his allegiance 
to certain philosophical “isms.” He sides with empiricism if it is understood as a 
“psychological theory” urging that “our perceptions influence our thinking more 
than our thinking influences our perceptions” (1991: 33).  He accepts materialism if 
it amounts to seeing humans as “part of the material world” and as holding that 
“social learning is part of how the material world functions” (1991: 34). And he 
commits to naturalism as the view that “knowledge and belief … must be grounded 
in the natural world, and they are themselves things which are susceptible to 
scientific explanation” (2007: 252). None of these commitments are defended in any 
detail; they are seen as preferences underpinning SSK.  
van Fraassen locates the main difference between the empiricist and the materialist 
stances in their respective admiration for empirical science. Bloor also seeks to 
follow the model of natural science: 
I have taken for granted and endorsed what I think is the standpoint of most 
contemporary science. In the main, science is causal, theoretical, value-neutral, 
often reductionist, to an extent empiricist, and ultimately materialistic like 
common sense. (1991: 157) 
Bloor’s well-known “strong programme” is said to “embody the same values which 
are taken for granted in other scientific disciplines.” The strong programme 
recommends that investigations in SSK be “causal,” “impartial,” “symmetrical” and 
“reflexive” (1991: 7). This is of course to advocate a set of policies for research rather 
than a theory about the world.  
Bloor elsewhere presents SSK as part of the “Einheitswissenschaft” of logical 
positivists. He draws particularly on the physicist Philipp Frank and his book 
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Wahrheit: Relativ oder Absolut (1952) (Bloor 2011). Frank argues that the progress of 
science “has been accompanied by an increase in ‘relativisation.’ Ever more concepts 
are modified with the expression ‘relative to a given frame of reference’” (1952: 73). 
Moreover Frank recommends relativism as “the only effective weapon against any 
kind of totalitarianism” (1952: 14). Again, the value-orientation is palpable.  
When it comes to motivating and defending relativism, Bloor has three lines of 
argument. One is to say that relativism is simply the denial of absolutism: “no 
absolute knowledge and no absolute morality”: “Knowledge and morality cannot 
transcend the machinery of our brains and the deliverances of our sense organs, the 
culture we occupy and the traditions on which we depend” (2007: 251). According to 
the second line of argument, SSK-relativism is supported by the fact that many 
impressive empirical studies rely on it as a methodological guide (Barnes and Bloor 
1982: 25). The third line of argument seeks to show that philosophical critics conflate 
SSK-relativism with unsavoury doctrines like “subjectivism,” “irrationalism,” or 
“scepticism” (Bloor 2011: 433).  
Finally, Bloor’s theory of rationality is at least structurally similar to the epistemic 
voluntarism defended by van Fraassen. Recall that van Fraassen restricts principles 
of rationality to deductive logic and the theory of probability, or—alternatively—to 
principles that prevent us from falling into self-sabotage. Over and above these 
principles we are free to choose. Bloor’s dichotomy is different. For him the basic 
level consists of our “natural inductive” or “natural deductive propensities.” These 
are studied by cognitive science, and are taken to be common to normal members of 
the human species. The second level consists of systems of “normative” rationality; 
these are different codifications of our reasoning propensities, according to the 
interests and negotiations of different groups. Normative rationality is the subject 
matter of the sociologist. (1991: 168-9) 
Since normative rationality is thus invariably a local phenomenon, Bloor thinks it is 
unlikely that the debate between relativism and absolutism could ever be resolved: 
“No relativist should believe that relativism can be proven true or that history is on 
its side …” (2011: 450) “So the sociology of knowledge is not bound to eliminate the 
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rival standpoint. It only has to separate itself from it, reject it, and make sure that its 
own house is in logical order.” (1991: 12)  
(c) Dealing with an objection 
There clearly are costs in reconstructing Bloor’s relativism as a stance rather than as 
a doctrine. It makes it more difficult to argue for or against it. Rather than testing the 
consistency of a brief dogma, and its coherence with other independently 
established truths, we have to engage with VEPPs that do not have truth-values at 
all. That makes the task of the critic a lot harder. 
There is also a deeper issue here. The obvious objection to the whole stance-idea 
might be put as follows: Of course, in his writings Bloor appeals to all sorts of VEPPs, 
and obviously he suggests a range of SSK policies. No-one denies that this is so. But 
why should we make these VEPPs part and parcel of his relativism? Why can’t we 
distinguish between his relativistic credo or dogma—say, “there are no context-free 
or super-cultural norms of rationality” (Barnes and Bloor 1982: 27)—on the one 
hand, and the various motivations for this credo, and the consequences drawn from 
it, on the other hand?  
The right answer seems to me to be the following. To attribute relativism as a stance 
is to make a claim about where one should locate the core or essence of the 
respective position. Do the advocates of the position foreground a claim or doctrine 
(about the world), and do they marshal their evidence and VEPPs as arguments for 
this doctrine? Or do the advocates put the emphasis on rebellion, admiration, and 
VEPPs, and treat stated credos as no more than rough glosses intended to point 
beyond themselves at the underlying epistemic and evaluative commitments?  
In Bloor’s case we are clearly dealing with the latter scenario. The claim that “there 
are no context-free or super-cultural norms of rationality” is not simply a descriptive 
claim for which Bloor assembles evidence. It is also, and indeed primarily, a 
reference first to his rebellion against any kind of absolutes, and second to his 
commitment to leave the study of human rationality to the empirical sciences. 
 20 
Rationality is to be studied empirically, and to do so is to identify contextual 
dependencies (albeit that the relevant context might sometimes be that of the 
whole species).  
To see Bloor’s position as a “stance” might also help us understand why arguments 
between philosophers and SSK-advocates are so often fruitless. Philosophers are 
focused on doctrines that they can test for consistency and coherence. And they get 
palpably annoyed when they do not find such snappy position statements. 
Philosophers see the lack of such statements as a lack of conceptual clarity and 
intellectual commitment. Indeed, confronted with this situation philosophers 
sometimes use something like the stance-idea—but with strictly negative 
connotations: the SSK-advocate is seen as guided by an animus against science, by 
physics- or philosophy-envy, and by a rejection of the demands of intellectual 
responsibility (Haack 1998). This might convince fellow philosophers, but it leaves 
sociologists cold.  
One of van Fraassen’s central motivations for interpreting empiricism as a stance, is 
the desire to find a common denominator for the numerous self-proclaimed 
empiricists in our tradition, from the Ancient Greek school of physicians, the 
“Empirici,” to the Vienna Circle and beyond. A short E+ like “Experience is the one 
and only source of information” (2002: 43) doesn’t do the trick. Invoking the 
rebellion against metaphysics (and related VEPPs) works much better. I submit that 
the same is true for relativism. If we start from a brief three-point definition, say of 
the kind offered in Paul Boghossian’s influential Fear of Knowledge (2006: 73), it is 
difficult to find any self-proclaimed, or otherwise identified, relativists who actually 
commit to this “R+”.iii Boghossian claims to be targeting Richard Rorty in particular, 
but he never shows in any detail that Rorty would accept Boghossian’s definition of 
epistemic relativism (2006: 60-63). The situation would be no different if instead we 
used the definition of relativism given in §5(a) above.  
Perhaps as is the case with empiricism, so also in the case of relativism it is easier to 
find a common denominator if we turn from dogmas to stances. What unites 
authors accused of, or happily embracing, forms of relativism—from the sophists to 
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Bloor and Rorty—is first and foremost the rebellion against forms of metaphysics, 
epistemology or ethics that posit absolutes (Herbert 2001; Kusch 1995, Kusch et al. 
2019). These absolutes are variously taken to be divine commands, ultimate 
scientific truths, consensi gentium, apodictic intuitions, or “truths that are there 
anyway.” Different relativist authors are preoccupied with opposing different such 
absolutes. But they all share the same animus. Interestingly enough, this rebellion 
against absolutes situates many relativists in the proximity of empiricism: the 
opposition to metaphysics is obviously a commonality. Many relativists also share 
further values or virtues: they oppose individualism, intellectual imperialism, or 
unchecked epistemic hierarchies, and they value epistemic humility, tolerance or 
equality. It seems to me that the shift from a relativist dogma to a relativist stance 
might bring into view a “tradition of relativist thinking” that up to now has been 
largely invisible.  
§6. Stance Relativism and Boghossian’s Challenges 
 
In this final section I shall discuss how stance-relativism of the kind discussed in this 
paper fares against Boghossian’s battery of anti-relativist arguments.  
 
(1) By “absolute relativism” Boghossian means a form of relativism that works with a 
mixture of absolute and relative principles. The paradigmatic case of this view is a 
relativism of manners based on the one absolute principle: “When in Rome do as the 
Romans do.” Or think of subjective Bayesians for whom the Bayesian formula is the 
one and only absolute principle. (Boghossian 2011: 67) 
 
Boghossian rejects absolute relativism as a viable form of relativism. By accepting 
the existence of one absolute principle, Boghossian submits, the relativist has lost 
what surely must be her strongest card, to wit, worries how absolute principles fit 
into the empirical world, and how they can be known by finite and fallible creatures. 
Moreover, the absolute relativist has no good answer to the question why there 
could not in principle be more than one absolute norm. (Boghossian 2011: 68) 
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A voluntaristic-epistemic relativism (of stances) can easily appear to be an instance 
of “absolute relativism.” After all, van Fraassen treats principles forbidding 
inconsistency and incoherence as definitive of rationality, and a different from 
epistemic policies. Nevertheless, it seems possible to defend van Fraassen against 
Boghossian’s considerations.  
 
One line of defence is to shift from moderate to radical epistemic voluntarism. This is 
the shift from fixed stance-transcending principles of rationality to stance-relative 
selections from a larger set of epistemic values. None of these values is absolute in 
the sense that it has to be present in every stance, or that it has to be always 
interpreted in the same way. Indeed, the set itself could be seen as a contingent 
product of our evolutionary and social history.  
 
Boghossian might regroup and focus instead on the demand not to self-sabotage. Is 
this not a universal demand of rationality? And doesn’t its presence make epistemic 
voluntarism a case of absolute relativism after all? Here too the epistemic voluntarist 
has a response—at least if she borrows a line from Bloor. She might insist that 
seeking to avoid self-sabotage is simply something we (most of us, most of the time) 
instinctively do. It is not a principle of rationality that “is there anyway,” but part and 
parcel of the “natural rationality” installed in us by a contingent evolutionary history.  
 
(2) Boghossian readily acknowledges that our epistemic practices vary, but he denies 
that that this variation supports relativism. What variation there is can be explained 
by the fact that our absolute rules are sometimes vague and unspecific. They leave 
room for choice. (Boghossian, pers. comm.; 2006: 110). This suggestion seems to fit 
with van Fraassen’s moderate epistemic voluntarism with its principles of rationality 
that leave our choices of stances or paradigms underdetermined. This underdetermi-
nation is removed only once VEPPs do their work.  
 
The first thing to note here is that Boghossian’s idea does not in fact block relativism. 
If true, all it suggests is that the scope of relativism is not unlimited. But the breadth 
of the scope remains completely open. Clearly, Boghossian, van Fraassen and Bloor 
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are likely to have very different views on this breadth. Moreover, the move from 
moderate to radical epistemic voluntarism again avoids Boghossian’s rendering of 
the relativist position. The radical version of epistemic voluntarism does not fit into 
Boghossian’s template. 
 
And yet, Boghossian might have a further reply specifically addressing radical 
epistemic voluntarism: If we allow, as we should, for appropriate forms of 
idealization and abstraction, then surely we will be able to construct general and 
absolute epistemic principles to which every normal human being is at least 
implicitly committed.  
 
The radical epistemic voluntarist might reply as follows. Yes indeed, we might 
proceed in the way Boghossian suggests. But we should not expect this methodology 
to lead to one unique outcome. On the contrary, work done in this way is faced with 
all the old issues concerning the underdetermination of theory by observation. 
Moreover, it might well be highly artificial and contrived to bring all of our epistemic 
folkways under one small set of absolute epistemic principles. Not to forget that 
abstract principles might be far too schematic to guide our epistemic conduct. 
Boghossian’s method would thus produce a merely schematic, but ultimately hollow 
form of absolutism.iv And last, but not least, what should we do with the actors’ own 
perspective on their epistemic folkways? Should we simply ignore this perspective? 
If not, what then should we say when the actors do not recognize their own 
reasoning in the epistemologists’ reconstructions and idealizations? (Kinzel and 
Kusch 2018) 
 
(3) Stances and perhaps even paradigms can be more or less different, more or less 
distant, from one another. The greater the difference or distance, the more we need 
the idea of “conversion” for capturing what happens when the folk or scientists shift 
from one stance or paradigm to another. And it is only when conversion is needed 
for capturing the change that epistemic relativism is vindicated.  
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Parts of Boghossian’s 2006 book can be read as offering a suggestion for how the 
relativism-motivating distance or difference between stances or paradigms can be 
captured. Boghossian distinguishes between “fundamental” and “derived” 
“epistemic principles.” A fundamental principle concerning observation licences 
perceptual beliefs under certain general conditions. A derived principle concerning 
observation licences the perceptual beliefs of a specific person, or perceptual belief 
given a specific instrument (like a microscope or telescope). Boghossian claims that 
two “epistemic systems”—that is, two systems of epistemic principles—are 
“fundamentally different” when they differ in at least one fundamental epistemic 
principle. And fundamental difference of epistemic systems is what defines a 
relativistic setting. Of course, Boghossian’s interest in all this is to bury relativism, 
not to praise it. He therefore goes on to argue that relativists have so far failed to 
offer a single convincing case of such fundamental difference between epistemic 
systems. In particular, Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine did not differ over any 
fundamental epistemic principle. (Boghossian 2006: 63-69, 90-91, 103-105) 
 
Can Boghossian’s concepts and criticisms be applied to van Fraassen’s relativism of 
stances? Has van Fraassen offered convincing examples of differences in 
fundamental epistemic principles? To my mind stance-relativism is not threatened 
by Boghossian’s considerations. To begin with, it is unlikely that van Fraassen’s 
would accept Boghossian’s criterion for a relativism-inducing difference in stances, 
that is, a difference in at least one fundamental principle. van Fraassen’s perspective 
is coherentist rather than foundationalist. What distinguishes Cardinal Bellarmine 
from Galileo is not one fundamental epistemic principle but a whole host of beliefs 
and VEPPs. It is the number and weight of these differences that requires a 
conversion, not the fundamental character of one of them. The distance from 
Boghossian increases further as we shift from moderate to radical epistemic 
voluntarism: the latter does not accept that everyone must share (the interpretation 
of) the same basic epistemic values.  
 
(4) As Boghossian has it, the epistemic relativist’s single best argument against 
absolute epistemic principles goes as follows:  
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(#) To justify our belief that our epistemic system S is absolutely correct, we 
invariably have to rely on this very S. This procedure is circular and thus 
unacceptable. Hence we cannot justify our belief that S is absolutely correct. And 
the same is true of any other S.  
 
Boghossian rejects (#). It is not generally true that no epistemic principle P can be 
used to justify itself. Such circularity is forbidden only if P has already become 
independently doubtful. (2006: 96-102) 
 
What would or could van Fraassen respond? Is he committed to rejecting epistemic 
circularity? I think not. By which I do not mean to suggest that van Fraassen agrees 
with Boghossian that the relativist has no good argument for his opposition to 
epistemic absolutes. As we saw above, van Fraassen holds that the best evidence for 
epistemic voluntarism, and thus for relativism, comes from the history of scientific 
revolutions. He is convinced that there have been many instances where the 
progress of science has involved seismic shifts in our epistemic values and policies. It 
is scientific revolutions, not any apriori reflections on rule-circularity, that should 
push us in the direction of relativism.  
 
(5) Boghossian (2011: 60-66) finds epistemic relativism inherently unstable. On the 
one hand, the relativist allows that epistemic systems fundamentally different from 
her own are, in some sense, as valid as her own. On the other hand, the relativist 
also prefers her own epistemic system and does not give it up. How can these two 
attitudes be reconciled? Boghossian is doubtful that relativism can deliver a plausible 
solution.  
 
van Fraassen’s response is perhaps best captured in the following remark (which 
was not addressing Boghossian’s considerations):  
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I remain convinced that genuine, conscious reflection on alternative beliefs, 
orientations, values—in an open and undogmatic spirit—does not 
automatically undermine one's own commitments. (2011: 156)  
 
Of course, we need an argument defending this conviction. I shall use radical 
epistemic voluntarism for providing such argument. It might go as follows. Under 
certain conditions, we can—from the perspective of our stance—recognize the 
VEPPs and beliefs of another stance as justifiable. That is, we can come to see 
the VEPPs and beliefs of another stance as rational provided only that we can 
identify a way of justifying them with reference to some plausible combination 
and weighting of epistemic values. If this proves possible, then the other stance 
is in some sense “equal” to our own. And yet, the fact that we can see the other 
stance in this light does not give us a reason to convert to it. After all, we might 
well have VEPPs and beliefs that differ from those of the other stance. And our 
VEPPs and beliefs might give us sufficient reason not to convert.  
 
The situation is different when we are faced with a crisis of confidence in our 
own epistemic system, when we are involved in a scientific (or other) revolution 
(of thought). In such situation we do not regard the other paradigm (or stance) 
as equal to our own; we regard the alternative as absurd. And we no longer 
know how to go on with our own paradigm. Note however that this is not the 
situation of relativistic epistemic voluntarism. The advocates of the latter do not 
(as yet) have any cause for a crisis of confidence (though they might well think of 
the absolutist alternatives as absurd).  
 
§7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have tried to develop van Fraassen’s epistemic voluntarism concerning 
stances and scientific paradigms in two main ways: by distinguishing between 
moderate and radical forms of epistemic voluntarism, and by rendering all forms of 
epistemic voluntarism as so many forms of epistemic relativism. In the process I have 
suggested that epistemic relativism can sometimes take the form of a stance rather 
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than a dogma, and that a relativistic epistemic voluntarism can be defended against 
Boghossian’s well-known battery of arguments against epistemic relativism. I hope 
to have made plausible the general thought that the two key ideas of van Fraassen’s 
Empirical Stance are worthy of further reflection and refinement.v  
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i In correspondence van Fraassen has suggested that his acceptance of Carnap’s 
“Principle of Tolerance” for languages is a radical-epistemic-voluntarist element in 
this work. Nevertheless, van Fraassen is not convinced that “consistency is just one 
epistemic virtue among others.” He argues as follows. Arthur Prior’s “tonk-language” 
is an instance of a language in which every sentence is inconsistent. The relevant 
sense of inconsistency here is proof-theoretic: everything follows logically from any 
sentence or set of sentences. In such language all distinctions collapse. van Fraassen 
concludes: “… a position within which all distinctions collapse could not even be 
called ‘relativist’.” -- I agree with the view that relativism is not the same as 
mysticism. The latter typically involves the idea of a “coincidentia oppositorum”, as 
Nicholas of Cusa put it. (I have heard Priest explain similar ideas from Buddhism.) To 
be clear, I do not adhere to these views. But are they irrational by definition? I am 
not so sure. Moreover, I do not think that the radical voluntarist must regard 
“consistency as just one epistemic virtue among others”. The “among others” 
perhaps hides an ambiguity. It is easily heard as “no better or no worse, and no more 
important” than the others. But in the present context it could also mean “it is part 
of the set of epistemic virtues and can sometimes be restricted in its scope and 
outweighed by other virtues”. I would tie radical voluntarism to the second 
rendering, not to the first. 
ii Of course determined metaphysician will resist this argument. They will insist that 
it is the very subject matter of metaphysics that precludes the option of empirical 
testing. Clearly, this topic requires much more space than I have here. I am grateful 
to Delia Belleri for pushing me on this point. 
iii Of course in some cases this will be so because the relativists adopt doctrines that 
are much more sophisticated than Boghossian allows for. This would make 
Boghossian’s arguments instances of the straw-man fallacy. 
iv Here I am indebted once more to Delia Belleri. 
v Work on this paper was made possible by ERC Ad Grant #339382. For comments I 
am deeply indebted to Bas van Fraassen, Delia Belleri, Anne-Kathrin Koch, Sophie 
Veigl, Dominik Finkelde and Paul Livingston. 
